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Abstract 
 
This paper analysed the OECD data on employment protection for 23 OECD countries over 
the time span 1990-2008 on the basis of alternative dynamic panel data models and panel 
causality tests and examines the validity of the neo-liberal argument that strictness of 
employment protection hurts labour through increased long-term and youth unemployment 
rates. While it finds no empirical basis for  this orthodox standpoint it observes that long-term 
unemployment dampens aggregate production which in turn aggravates unemployment 
problem.  
JEL Codes: K31, J08, J50, J60, J83 
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long-term unemployment; youth unemployment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The regulation of labour market to protect the interest of labour is often taken as an 
exogenous interference with market relations causing a rise in unemployment and poverty.  
During the era of Reaganomics and Thatcherism in the 1980s, USA and UK underwent a 
process of labour market deregulation (along with other things) and subsequently it has 
become the essential part of ‘Washington Consensus’-IMF-World Bank policy package 
prescribed to the crisis-stricken  less developed countries.   
 
In the late 1990s La Porta and his collaborators (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; 2006, 
2008; Djankov et al., 2003; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Beck et al., 2003a, 2003b; 
Botero et al., 2004) set in motion a series of systematic analysis of the relationships between 
legal and economic variables.  Legal variables (‘leximetric’ data) are by and large binary 
variables (0, 1) used to quantify the quality of various types of law that exist in different 
countries to protect the interests of various stakeholders such as shareholders, creditors and 
labourers. The countries are classified according to their ‘legal origin’: English common law 
and civil law are two broad categories. Through various cross-section regression studies of 
these ‘leximetric’ data, it is argued that English common law systems are more market-
friendly; they provide higher level of shareholder and creditor protection to promote financial 
development. It is also pointed out that the civil law countries interfere more in the labour 
market which exerts a negative impact on employment and productivity.   
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In this perspective, we shall study one crucial aspect of labour law –employment protection 
and its unemployment consequence on the basis of the OECD data available over the time 
span 1990-2008.  In the next section we shall discuss in brief the cases for and against labour 
regulations, especially from the perspective of its unemployment consequences. In Section 3 
we shall discuss the short-term and long-term relationship between various aspects of labour 
regulation and unemployment through dynamic panel data modelling and causality tests. 
Section 4 provides summary and conclusion.  
 
2. The Cases For and Against Labour Regulation: A Brief Overview 
 
From the standpoint of social democracy, state interventions in the labour market facilitate 
better or fairer income distribution and improve the quality of life of the working class. 
Instead of having a regime of classical antagonistic capitalism riddled with class struggles the 
social democracy calls for a cooperative capitalism which is expected to mitigate the 
potential destabilising force of class struggles and social unrest (communist insurgencies). In  
‘structuralist’/neo-Kaleckian macro models (see for e.g. Dutt 1984), it is even shown that 
better income distribution in favour of  the working class solves the problem of ‘realisation 
crisis’ of capitalism (pinpointed by Karl Marx) as it increases effective demand and 
profitability of production thereby promoting investment and growth. These models, 
however, over-emphasised the forces of ‘realisation ‘and overlooked the ‘profit squeeze’ 
force (also pinpointed by Karl Marx) - better income distribution and higher real wages 
reduce profitability and dampen investment and growth (see Bhaduri and Margin, 1990 and 
Sarkar 1992, 1993).  
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Whatever may be the ambiguity in the relationship between growth and distribution, the 
policy of social democracy and welfare states dominated in most of the industrialised 
countries during the first three decades after the Second World War. Accepting labour market 
‘distortions’ due to labour regulations and trade union activities as hard realities, the 
governments pursued Keynesian full employment policy – namely fiscal stimulus to inject 
extra demand into the economic system. 
 
In the face of oil price hike in the mid-1970s, the industrialised countries faced the problem 
of stagflation (simultaneous occurrence of recession and inflation); continuation of Keynesian 
fiscal stimulus policy aggravated the problem of inflation without making any dent on the 
problem of unemployment and recession. This marked the demise of Keynesianism in favour 
of a ‘neo-liberal’ era of Reaganomics/Thatcherism that found its place in the subsequent 
IMF/World Bank policy prescriptions, known as Washington Consensus. This is actually an 
old wine in a new bottle – the resurrection of old laissez-faire philosophy and ‘Invisible 
Hand’ theorised in college textbook of neoclassical economics as self-equilibrating market 
solution to all economic problems including unemployment. The collapse of Berlin Wall and 
the demise of Soviet Union gave further impetus to this ‘neoliberal’ ideology in the absence 
of a credible threat from communism. 
 
In essence the policies shifted towards deregulations of markets (including labour markets) to 
pave the way for free market forces.  It is argued that firms will respond to stringent labour 
regulation by substituting capital for labour; even there will be a shift in production from the 
formal sector to unregulated areas of the economy and/or flight of capital and relocation of 
production in a country with more market-friendly labour regulation (Fallon and Lucas, 1993; 
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Heckman and Pagés, 2000; Botero et al., 2004). In the words of Besley and Burgess (2004: 
101), ‘labor regulation will typically create adjustment costs in hiring and firing labor’.  
 
The neo-liberal arguments for labour market deregulations, however, failed to convince many 
scholars such as Richard B. Freeman (see for e.g. Freeman, 1993 and 2005) who continue to 
argue in favour of labour regulations. Apart from the arguments from the perspective of  fair 
income distribution, social justice, social security etc (often brushed aside by the proponents 
of economics as   ‘science’ that precludes value judgement and  interpersonal utility 
comparisons)  there are some other arguments such as  the laws setting basic labour standards 
in the areas of pay and working time and providing employees with protection against 
arbitrary discipline or dismissal may encourage firms and workers to co-invest in firm 
specific skills and complementary productive assets (Sengenberger and Campbell 1994); 
legislation mandating collective employee representation in the workplace can help raise 
worker commitment and morale (Rogers and Streeck, 1995). For more other arguments and 
references see Deakin and Sarkar, 2008 and 2011). 
 
There are different studies to examine the economic consequences of labour regulation. In the 
context of OECD countries some studies tried to prove that employment protection led to 
unemployment. For details of these studies and their strong critique see Baker at el., (2004). 
In the context of India, an influential study was conducted by Besley and Burgess (2004).  
Their analysis was based on an index of changes in state-level (i.e. provincial level) labour 
laws in India; it showed that that Indian provinces (‘states ‘) which enacted pro-labour 
regulation experienced lowered output, employment, investment, and productivity in 
registered or formal manufacturing.  Bhattacharjea (2006) strongly refuted their arguments. 
One very important point was raised by Bhattacharjea (2006): the ‘license raj’ (regime of 
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licenses) dominated the period of study (1958-92) of   Besley     and    Burgess (2004); 
discriminatory allocation    of   industrial   licenses   across the states by   the central  
government  was a significant determinant of industrial location during that period. 
 
Another influential work was conducted by Botero et al. (2004); it was partly funded by the 
World Bank.  Botero et al. based their analysis on an index of labour regulation consisting of 
around 60 individual indicators, covering a full range of labour law rules, including laws on 
the employment relationship, collective labour relations, and social security.  Their index 
covered 85 countries and coded for their laws as they stood in the late 1990s.  The 
econometric analysis carried out by Botero et al. (2004) found that higher scores on the 
labour index were correlated with lower male employment, higher youth unemployment, and 
a larger informal sector.   
 
In this perspective a team of legal scholars at Centre for Business Research, CBR 
(University of Cambridge, UK) generated a detailed dataset for four OECD 
countries (UK, USA, France and Germany) and India over a long time-span (see 
Deakin et al 2007). Using this dataset Deakin and Sarkar (2008, 2011) examined 
various aspects of labour regulations of these five countries and their economic 
consequences. They observed that the USA is the only country where an inverse 
relationship exists between labour regulation and employment growth; this is 
because of the changes in the US regulation of dismissal—the only area in which 
there was a significant change in US law over the period of this study. 
 
The present study seeks to carry these analyses further. Since the CBR data cover only five 
countries, the present study uses the OECD data on strictness of regular and temporary labour 
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employment protection   over the time span 1990-2008 and examines their unemployment 
consequences through dynamic panel data modelling. 
 
3. The Present Study: Estimates of Short run and Long-run Relationships 
 
The OECD data on employment protection indices are available for OECD countries and 
some non-OECD countries (see Venn, 2009 for details of index construction).   But due to 
non-availability of the relevant data for all the years between 1990 and 2008, we have 
considered only 23 OECD countries (among the new members only Korea is included). We 
have considered regulations concerning both regular and temporary employment protection 
series (hereafter REGLAB and TEMPOLAB, respectively). 
 
For unemployment rate we have used three alternative series: 
(i) Rate of unemployment as percentage of civilian labour force (TU); 
(ii) Long-term unemployment rate (LU) defined as persons unemployed for 12 months or 
more as a percentage of total unemployed; 
(iii) Youth unemployment rate (YU) defined as total youth unemployment as percentage of 
total labour force aged 15 to 24. 
 
Our objective is to examine the relationship between employment protection index and 
different indicators of unemployment. To control for the level of economic activity of a 
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country we shall consider (log of) GDP in purchasing power parity dollars (LPPPY).  
Excepting youth unemployment data (which is available from the source of World Bank -see 
Table 1 for details), all other data are available from OECD iLibrary (see Table 1 for details). 
 
We have followed the dynamic panel data methodology (described below) which takes into 
account a short-term relationship and a time path leading to a long-term relationship. This 
helps us to ascertain whether there exists a short-term relationship between employment 
protection and unemployment and whether there exists a stable adjustment path leading to a 
long-term relationship. The conventional regression study assumes that the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables is instantaneous – this is what we capture 
in our long-run relationship.  To get a meaningful long run relationship   one should analyse a 
short-term relationship (if any) and examine whether there exists a stable adjustment process 
leading to the long-run relationship (if any). A panel regression based on a short-term time 
series has the constraint of studying only the instantaneous relationship which may not be 
meaningful, rather spurious. We have here a sufficiently long (1990-2008) panel data for 23 
countries to remove this lacuna of the existing literature. 
 
Alternative Dynamic Panel Data Models 
 
For a large time dimension of panel data (as we have here), Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
showed that the traditional procedures for estimation of pooled models, such as the fixed 
effects, instrumental variables, and generalized method of moments (GMM) ‘can produce 
inconsistent, and potentially very misleading estimates of the average values of the 
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parameters in dynamic panel data models’ (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p.622).  Therefore, to 
ascertain the nature of the relationships between employment protection regulation and 
unemployment we shall use the Pesaran-Shin dynamic panel data analysis. 
 
We start with a postulate of long-run relationship involving X (the unemployment rate, TU, 
LU or YU), Y (GDP in purchasing power parity dollar - in natural log, LPPPCY) and Z 
(employment protection index, REGLAB or TEMPOLAB): 
 
(1)   Xit = ψi Yit + pii Zit   + η it 
 
where i (=1,2,3,4,..23) stands for countries, t (=1,2,… T) stands for time-periods (years), 
ψi and pii   are the long-run parameters and  ηit  is the error term. 
  
We are interested to know whether there exist long-term and short-term effects of Z 
(employment protection regulation) along with Y (GDP measuring economic activities) on X 
(unemployment rate) and whether there exists a stable adjustment path from the short-term 
relationship (if any) to the long-run relationship.   
                                                                           
Following Pesaran and Shin (1999), our panel data analysis is based on the following error 
correction representation: 
                                                 p-1                    q-1                         r-1       
(2) ∆Xit = θi(η it-1) +   Σλij ∆Xi, t-j + Σψ ik ∆Y i, t-k + Σpiil ∆Zi, t-l + µi +  φit                
                                                 j = 1                  k  =  0                      l = 0 
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 where ∆ is the difference operator, θi is the group-specific error-correcting speed of 
adjustment term, λij, ψik  and piij are the coefficients of the lagged variables, µi  is the 
country fixed effect and φit is the disturbances term. The existence of a meaningful long-run 
relationship with a stable adjustment dynamics requires θi < 0. 
 
Under this general structure, we can have three alternative models. On one extreme, we can 
have dynamic fixed effect estimators (DFE) where intercepts are allowed to vary across the 
countries and all other parameters and error variances are constrained to be the same. At the 
other extreme, one can estimate separate equations for each group and calculate the mean of 
the estimates to get a glimpse of the over-all picture. This is called mean group estimator 
(MG). Pesaran and Smith (1995) showed that MG gives consistent estimates of the averages 
of parameters. The intermediate alternative is pooled mean group (PMG) estimator, 
suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999). It allows intercepts, short-run coefficients and error 
variances to differ freely across the countries but the long run coefficients are constrained to 
be the same; that means, ψi =  ψ and  pii = pi for all i in equation (1) while θi , λij  etc of 
equation (2) may differ from country to country.  
 
Using the STATA ado developed by Blackburne and Frank (2007) we have estimated all the 
three alternative models, MG, PMG and DFE (Table 1). Based on Lag Exclusion Wald Test 
for each variable separately we have determined the lag structure (p, q, r).    
(Insert Table 1 here) 
11 
 
A series of Hausman tests - PMG vs.MG, PMG vs. DFE and DFE vs. MG (details not 
reported here) confirms appropriateness of the DFE model. This implies that the OECD 
countries covered in the study differ only in fixed effect (determined by time-invariant 
explanatory variables not included in the study) - they do not differ in short-term or long-term 
relationships between unemployment and employment protection regulations and the time-
path connecting the two relationships. 
 
We have also conducted VEC (Vector Error Correction) Granger Causality/ Block 
Exogeneity Wald Tests to ascertain the direction of causality. To determine the order of the 
test we have used a number of criteria1 and have chosen the maximum order of the VAR 
(Vector Autoregression) model and subtracted 1 from that to arrive at the order of the VEC 
model. Estimates are reported in Table 2. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Combining the estimates of Table 1 and Table 2 we can make the following observations: 
1. Relationship between employment protection regulations and total unemployment 
rate: We find a causal influence of REGLAB on TU. But we find no such relationship 
between TEMPOLAB and TU (Table 2 Parts I.A and II.A). None of the dynamic 
panel data models found a significant long-run relationship between TU and 
REGLAB or TEMPOLAB (Table 1 Parts I.A and II.A).2 Hence the nature of the 
causal relationship cannot be ascertained. This casts doubt on the contention that 
strictness of employment protection contributes toward general unemployment 
problem. 
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2. Relationship between employment protection regulations and long-term 
unemployment rate: We observe no causal relationship between LU and REGLAB or 
TEMPOLAB. In conformity with this result, our panel data models show that neither 
REGLAB nor TEMPOLAB has a short-run relationship with LU.  Examining only 
the statistically significant long-run relationships, we observe that the PMG model 
shows a negative relationship between REGLAB and LU while the DFE model shows 
a similar relationship between TEMPOLAB and LU (Tables 1 and 2 Parts I.B and 
II.B). So the contention that strictness of employment protection aggravates long-term 
unemployment problem cannot be supported by our causality test and panel data 
modelling. 
3.  Relationship between employment protection regulations and youth unemployment 
rate: None of the panel data models found a short-term or long-term relationship 
between YU and REGLAB (Table 1, Part I.C). Only the PMG model shows a 
significant long-term positive relationship between YU and TEMPOLAB whereas all 
the models show a short-term negative relationship. As there is no causal relationship 
between youth unemployment (YU) and REGLAB or TEMPOLAB (Table 2 Parts I.C 
and II.C) we can conclude that neither regular nor temporary employment protection 
regulations can be blamed for the problem of youth unemployment problem. 
4. Relationship between GDP and Unemployment Rate: Our causality tests show a 
causal relationship running from unemployment (each of the three measures, TU, LU 
and YU) to aggregate production as measured by GDP (LPPPY). All the DFE models 
show a negative long-term relationship in each case and other models by and large 
corroborate this type of relationship. The explanation can be found in 
‘underconsumptionist’ or ‘statgnationist’ literature (see Dutt, 1984; Steindl, 1952 and 
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1979 and Taylor, 1983 and 1991): higher unemployment and lower wage income 
reduces aggregate demand and production (see also Deakin and Sarkar, 2011 for a 
similar conclusion in the Indian context). Furthermore, there is reverse causality from 
GDP (LPPPY) to LU implying lower aggregate production leads to more long-term 
unemployment.  
 
     4.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
In the perspective of dominant orthodox standpoint against state-intervention to protect 
the interest of labour, this paper examines a longitudinal dataset prepared by OECD 
(Venn,2009) on strictness of regular and temporary labour employment protection   for 23 
OECD countries over the time span 1990-2008. It uses three alternative dynamic panel 
data models –dynamic fixed effect, mean group and pooled mean group models and 
examines the short-term as well as long-term effects of employment protection on various 
measures of unemployment rate – over-all unemployment rate, long-term unemployment 
rate and youth unemployment rate. To supplement the dynamic panel data modelling, it 
also uses VEC (Vector Error Correction) Granger causality. It finds only one causal 
relationship following from regular employment protection to total unemployment rate 
but the nature of the causal influence cannot be ascertained from dynamic panel data 
models. Only one dynamic panel model (PMG) shows a significant long-term positive 
relationship between youth unemployment and temporary employment protection 
regulation but the causality test cannot ascertain the direction of causality.  There is no 
causal relationship between long run unemployment rate and employment protection 
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regulations. Our panel data models find no short-term or long-term positive relationship 
between long-run unemployment and employment protection. 
 
Thus our study casts serious doubt on the orthodox standpoint that strictness of 
employment protection hurts labour through increased unemployment. As a by-product of 
our study we find a clear dampening impact of rising unemployment (which does not 
follow from strict labour regulations) on aggregate production which in turn aggravates 
long-term unemployment problem. The policy prescription should be employment 
generation by other means (perhaps Keynesian policy of fiscal stimulus rather than neo-
liberal ‘hire and fire’ labour regulations) to tide over sluggish demand and production.   
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Foot Notes 
 
1 The criteria are: LR (sequential modified LR test statistic), FPE (Final prediction 
error), AIC (Akaike information criterion), SC (Schwarz information criterion) and HQ 
(Hannan-Quinn information criterion). For further details of VEC Granger causality tests see 
Table 2, note 1. 
2 There is no short-run relationship between TU and REGLAB. In two models (MG and 
DFE), however, we observe that the short-run relationship between TEMPOLAB and TU is 
negative (!) -not even a loose support to the orthodox standpoint!  
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Table 1. Short-run and Long-run Relationships between Labour Regulation Index on 
Unemployment, 1990-2008: Dynamic Panel Data Models 
Part No. Models1 PMG MG DFE 
  Impact of  Strictness of 
Employment Protection-Regular 
Employment (REGLAB) , Z  
on 
   
I.A  Rate of Unemployment (as 
percentage of civilian labour 
force), TU (X) 
   
 Long-term Relationship    
 Y (LPPPY) -5.879** -7.983* -3.947** 
 Z (REGLAB) -0.471 10.158 2.272 
 Short-term Relationship    
 θ -0.251** -0.353** -0.188** 
 ∆Xt-1 0.369** 0.369** 0.452** 
 ∆Yt -11.911** -10.173** -11.139** 
 ∆Zt -0.58 -2.325 -0.747 
 µ 11.622** 3.305 5.613** 
 Chosen Model2   DFE 
I.B  Long-term unemployment (more 
than one year) as percentage of 
total unemployment, LU (X) 
   
 Long-term Relationship    
 Y (LPPPY) -17.584** -18.603 -13.467** 
 Z (REGLAB) -10.229** -47.153 -2.648 
 Short-term Relationship    
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 θ -0.372** -0.657** -0.274** 
 ∆Xt-1 0.19** 0.232** 0.187** 
 ∆Yt 13.062 12.081 9.556 
 ∆Zt 3.654 11.447 -1.829 
 µ 56.142** 96.873 32.124** 
 Chosen Model2   DFE 
I.C Youth unemployment as 
percentage of total labour force in 
the age group 15-24, YU (X) 
 
   
  Long-term Relationship     
 Y (LPPPY) -7.88** -11.239 -4.468** 
 Z (REGLAB) -0.909 23.875 2.951 
 Short-term Relationship    
 θ -0.259** -0.446** -0.222** 
 ∆Xt-1 0.227** 0.278** 0.302** 
 ∆Yt -26.527** -22.582** -25.222** 
 ∆Zt -8.456 -10.463 -1.409 
 µ 17.753** 7.229 9.36** 
 Chosen Model2   DFE 
 II. Impact of  Strictness of 
Employment Protection-
Temporary Employment 
(TEMPOLAB ), Z 
on 
   
II.A  Rate of Unemployment (as 
percentage of civilian labour 
force), TU (X) 
   
 Long-term Relationship    
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 Y (LPPPCY) -6.319** -1.782 -3.794** 
 Z (TEMPOLAB) 0.121 0.317 0.549 
 Short-term Relationship    
 θ -0.268** -0.378** -0.188** 
 ∆Xt-1 0.345** 0.319** 0.466** 
 ∆Xt-2 0.08 0.051 -0.021 
 ∆Yt -12.691** -11.632** -11.158** 
 ∆Zt 0.279 -1.054* -0.467** 
 µ 12.831** 5.619 6.095** 
 Chosen Model2   DFE 
II.B  Long-term unemployment (more 
than one year) as percentage of 
total unemployment, LU (X) 
   
 Long-term Relationship    
 Y (LPPPCY) -15.784** -10.961** -14.884** 
 Z (TEMPOLAB) 0.377 -1.374 -2.464* 
 Short-term Relationship    
 θ -0.381** -0.669** -0.287** 
 ∆Xt-1 0.209** 0.254** 0.188** 
 ∆Yt 11.267 18.752** 9.221 
 ∆Zt -2.813 -2.242 -0.166 
 µ 46.555** 56.832** 36.168** 
 Chosen Model
2
 
  DFE 
II.C Youth unemployment as 
percentage of total labour force in 
the age group 15-24, YU (X) 
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  Long-term Relationship     
 Y (LPPPCY) -9.819** 2.235 -5.229** 
 Z (TEMPOLAB) 1.164** -24.643 1.203 
 Short-term Relationship    
 θ -0.215** -0.347** -0.213** 
 ∆Xt-2 0.094* 0.109** 0.106* 
 ∆Xt-3 -0.042 -0.002 .014 
 ∆Yt -33.663** -28.24** -27.365** 
 ∆Zt -1.007* -2.457** -1.127** 
 µ 18.17** 9.649 10.908** 
 Chosen Model2   DFE 
 
* Significant at 5 per cent level. 
** Significant at 1 per cent level. 
1 The regressors are estimated from the following long-term relationship and its error 
correction form. 
Long-run Relationship: 
 
Xit = ψi Yit + pii Zit   + η it 
 
where i (=1,2,3,..23) represents countries, t (=1,2,… T) represents periods (years), ψi and pii   
are the long-run parameters and  ηit is the error term. 
 
It’s Error Correction Form: 
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                                                 p-1                    q-1                         r-1       
 ∆Xit = θi(η it-1) +   Σλij ∆Xi, t-j + Σψ ik ∆Y i, t-k + Σpiil ∆Zi, t-l + µi +  φit                
                                                 j = 1                  k  =  0                      l = 0 
 
 where ∆ is the difference operator, θi is the group-specific error-correcting speed of 
adjustment term, λij, ψik  and piij are the coefficients of the lagged variables, µi  is the 
country fixed effect and φit is the disturbances term. The existence of a meaningful long-run 
relationship with a stable adjustment dynamics requires θi < 0. 
2 An appropriate model is chosen on the basis of a series of Hausman tests. 
 
Data Sources:  
REGLAB, TEMPOLAB, TU, LU and LPPPY are from OECD iLibrary available online: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ALFS_SUMTAB. 
YU is collected from World Development Indicators compliled by World Bank, available 
online: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
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Table 2. Labour regulation, unemployment and GDP in 23 OECD countries, 1990-2008: 
VEC causality analysis1 
 
Part No Dependent 
variable 
Excluded 
independent 
variable 
Chi-square Degree of 
freedom 
Probability 
I.A      
 TU     
  LPPPY   9.747219 7  0.2034 
  REGLAB  17.90540* 7  0.0124 
 LPPPY     
  TU  23.24136* 7  0.0015 
  REGLAB  5.329991 7  0.6198 
 REGLAB     
  TU  7.111341 7  0.4174 
  LPPPY  7.979373 7  0.3344 
I.B      
 LU     
  LPPPY   36.72932* 7  0.0000 
  REGLAB  5.156955 7  0.6408 
 LPPPY     
  LU  25.67149* 7  0.0006 
  REGLAB  6.203194 7  0.5162 
 REGLAB     
  LU  4.277353 7  0.7473 
  LPPPY  3.163608 7  0.8695 
I.C      
 YU     
  LPPPY   8.753818 7  0.2708 
  REGLAB  6.639573 7  0.4673 
 LPPPY     
  YU  15.29253* 7  0.0324 
  REGLAB  4.700915 7  0.6964 
 REGLAB     
  YU  8.676888 7  0.2767 
  LPPPY  9.116684 7  0.2444 
II.A      
 TU     
  LPPPY   7.009315 5  0.2199 
  TEMPOLAB  10.80637 5  0.0554 
 LPPPY     
  TU  19.16606* 5  0.0018 
  TEMPOLAB  9.973051 5  0.0760 
 TEMPOLAB     
  TU  8.792223 5  0.1176 
  LPPPY  3.032552 5  0.6950 
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II.B      
 LU     
  LPPPY   38.98773* 5  0.0000 
  TEMPOLAB  1.376023 5  0.9269 
 LPPPY     
  LU  18.05062* 5  0.0029 
  TEMPOLAB  7.095796 5  0.2136 
 TEMPOLAB     
  LU  4.571372 5  0.4704 
  LPPPY  6.444890 5  0.2653 
II.C      
 YU     
  LPPPY   7.270453 5  0.2013 
  TEMPOLAB  6.495216 5  0.2610 
 LPPPY     
  YU  12.45790* 5  0.0290 
  TEMPOLAB  7.418688 5  0.1913 
 TEMPOLAB     
  YU  6.100480 5  0.2966 
  LPPPY  4.209166 5  0.5197 
 
* Significant at the 5% level: the null hypothesis of no causality is rejected. 
 
 
1 The VEC (Vector-Error-Correction)-Granger causality tests are done on the basis of 
first differences of the variables. To understand whether the direction of causality is from 
labour protection (Z) to unemployment (X) or the opposite or both (mutual causation) we 
used panel VEC Granger causality test. To ascertain whether Z causes X, we fit a regression 
where first difference of X (the alternative rates of unemployment, taken one at a time), ∆X is 
a function of its past values (lagged first differences) and past values of first difference of Y 
(GDP, in natural log, LPPPY), ∆Y and past values of first difference of Z (various labour 
protection indexes taken one at a time), ∆Z: 
                                     p-1                    q-1                          r-1       
 ∆Xit =   µ + Σλj ∆Xi, t-j + Σψ k ∆Y i, t-k + Σpil ∆Zi, t-l + +  φit                
                                        
                                    j = 1                  k  =  1           l = 1 
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Fitting the above equation one has to test whether the coefficients of the lags of ∆Z are 
jointly significant (different from zero) through the Wald-test statistic. The null hypothesis is 
  
pi1= pi2 =…. = pik = 0.  If the Wald test statistic calculated on the basis of this null hypothesis is 
very high (higher than a critical value), we can say that Z causes X (rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no causality). 
Similarly to test whether X causes Z we fit a regression where ∆Z is a function of its past 
values and the past values of ∆X and ∆Y and test the joint significance of the coefficients of 
the lags of ∆X.   
 
We have used a number of criteria such as LR (sequential modified LR test statistic), FPE 
(Final prediction error), AIC (Akaike information criterion), SC (Schwarz information 
criterion) and HQ (Hannan-Quinn information criterion) and have chosen the maximum order 
of the VAR (Vector Autoregression) model and subtracted 1 to arrive at the  order of the 
VEC model. 
 
Data Sources: See Table 1. 
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